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SCANDAL, SUKYANDARU, AND CHOUWEN 
Benjamin L. Liebman* 
Secrets, Sex and Spectacle: The Rules of Scandal in Japan and the 
United States. By Mark D. West. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press. 2006. Pp. v, 404. $45. 
 
Jose Canseco’s use of steroids, the sale of used girls’ underwear in 
Japan, penile mutilation, and the moral failings of both Bill Clinton and 
former Japanese Prime Minister Sosuke Uno are not topics that often appear 
side by side, much less in a scholarly work of comparative law. And few law 
professors have the chance to publish a book whose jacket features a picture 
of a scantily clad woman. In Secrets, Sex and Spectacle, Mark West1 does 
both. He also does much more, unraveling the interplay of social and legal 
rules that influence the formation of scandal and spectacle in Japan and the 
United States. 
West clearly delights in the retelling of scandal. His readers will as well. 
Yet his aim is not simply to provide an account of scandal in Japanese (and 
American) society; it is to explore in a comparative context what makes cer-
tain conduct scandalous and how societies differ in the formation and 
management of scandal. In keeping with these aims, West’s study is also a 
call for greater emphasis on the comparative study of scandal and its interac-
tion with law.  
This Review takes up West’s challenge, discussing West’s book with ref-
erence to China. Secrets, Sex, and Spectacle has little, if anything, to do with 
China. Nevertheless, examination of scandal in China largely supports 
West’s central arguments: institutions and rules, both formal and informal, 
matter in determining the types of occurrences that become scandal in a 
given society; and scandal is not simply the product of culture.  
China’s recent experience with scandal also shows some of the ways 
scandal can play a positive role in opening up discussion of taboo topics—
perhaps even more so in a nondemocratic state than in a liberal democracy. 
Analysis of selected recent Chinese scandals, however, also suggests the 
benefit of further refinement of West’s analysis. These refinements would 
allow us to better understand the complex interactions among norms, institu-
tions, and individuals that contribute to the formation of scandal, and 
perhaps to better understand what makes scandal important. Examining 
West’s book in the context of China also suggests that some of West’s more 
striking findings, in particular those regarding defamation litigation in  
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Director of the Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law 
School. I am grateful to Robert Ferguson, Curtis Milhaupt, Frank Upham, and Yu Fei for comments 
and Chen Zi and Shen Yang for research assistance.  
 1. Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138462
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Japan, are perhaps not as surprising when placed in a broader comparative 
context. 
This Review proceeds in four parts. Part I describes West’s account of 
scandal in Japan and the United States and explores some of the ramifica-
tions of his account. Part II examines the formation of scandal in 
contemporary China. Part III compares scandal in China with West’s con-
clusions about scandal in Japan and the United States. Part IV discusses 
defamation litigation in China, with a view to adding further comparative 
insight to West’s discussion of Japanese libel suits. 
I. Scandal in Japan and the United States 
A. The Book 
West’s goal in the book is to offer a “new framework for understanding 
scandal” (p. 3). He does so by providing a “detailed ethnography” of scan-
dal (most often translated as sukyandaru) in Japan, with comparative 
reference to the United States (p. 9). He defines scandal as “an event in 
which the public revelation of an alleged private breach of a law or a norm 
results in significant social disapproval or debate and, usually, reputational 
damage” (p. 6, emphasis omitted). His aim is to “explore the ways rules 
bring structure to the who, what, when, where, and why of the sliver of hu-
man behavior that ‘catches’ as scandal in Japan and America” (p. 8). He 
argues that rules regarding what is considered scandal and how scandals 
play out in the media help to explain similarities and differences in what 
becomes scandal in Japan and the United States. Examination of these rules 
shows a crucial difference between the two countries: “Japan tends to em-
phasize group-based private rule creation and enforcement” and private 
ordering, while in the United States there is greater “emphasis on public 
ordering” (p. 8).  
West also challenges three existing trends in scholarship on Japan and 
on scandal. First, he objects to those who see scandal as irrevocably linked 
to culture—“inevitable, beyond our control, or perhaps just plain random” 
(p. 9). Second, he disagrees with those who view scandal as representing 
moral decay or simply the seeking of “cheap thrills” (p. 9). And finally he 
critiques those who resort to “glib and broad generalizations about Japanese 
‘culture’ ” (p. 10). 
West describes the key institutional players involved in scandal in Japan: 
the media, lawyers, prosecutors, and other scandal professionals. We learn 
of the bifurcation of the Japanese media, between the often conservative, 
elite publishers and television news programs that often shy away from and 
cover up scandal, and the non-elite tabloids and “wideshow” television pro-
grams that “go for the jugular” and revel in running stories the elites ignore 
(p. 19). The Internet also exposes scandals that don’t make it into the me-
dia—sometimes leading to reports in print or on television. Media 
misconduct is widespread and, in contrast to the United States, institutional, 
with made-up news and false accusations the norm (p. 34). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138462
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Other players in the formation and management of scandal include 
prosecutors, although Japanese prosecutors play a smaller role in scandal 
than do their American counterparts (pp. 35–44). Prosecutors in Japan are 
“elite bureaucrats” who have little to gain from a high profile prosecution (p. 
35). Likewise, lawyers play much smaller roles in Japanese scandals than 
they do in American scandals, in part because trials are rarely a central fea-
ture of Japanese scandals (pp. 52–54). 
West also analyzes the roles of privacy and honor in Japan and the 
United States. His central argument is that honor is of greater importance in 
Japan than in the United States; this affects both what becomes a scandal 
and how scandals evolve: “[I]n Japan, it’s honor that matters” (p. 109). The 
primary manifestation of this difference is in defamation litigation, where 
both legislation and court decisions make it far easier for plaintiffs to win in 
Japan than in the United States. If the reported matter is not of public con-
cern, truth is not a defense (p. 77). Other aspects of defamation law likewise 
are plaintiff-friendly: the defendant has the burden of proof regarding truth, 
there is no required showing of economic harm to the plaintiff, and defen-
dants are required to show that their reports met a reasonableness standard 
even when reporting on a matter of public concern (pp. 74–78).  
Japan has a far higher rate of defamation litigation than does the United 
States. West expresses surprise at this finding, noting that compared to the 
United States Japan has double the number of defamation cases per capita 
“despite the fact that America has about fifty times as many lawyers” (p. 85, 
emphasis omitted). This finding is all the more noteworthy given that dam-
ages in Japan are generally low when compared to those in the United 
States. This shows, West argues, that cases in Japan are “not about money”; 
they are about honor. In contrast to the United States, celebrities and politi-
cians are frequent plaintiffs in Japan, and thus defamation lawsuits are often 
an important part of celebrity scandal. In Japan, “everyone wins” in such 
cases: the tabloid press attracts readers, the public gets the scandals it 
craves, and the pro-plaintiff legal standards mean that celebrities frequently 
win their cases (p. 106). 
Another central theme in Japanese scandals is the importance of groups. 
Collective norms often encourage secrecy and cover-up, and an emphasis on 
uniformity over diversity means that certain topics are largely off the table, 
most notably matters concerning minority groups such as the Burakumin 
(pp. 157–62). Group rules also mean that scandals involving only individu-
als, such as insider trading, are often not big news—unless they involve sex. 
Political scandals, meanwhile, are managed to protect the group (the party 
or faction) rather than the individual. The bottom line, West argues, is that 
groups play a major role “in determining how scandals in Japan are pre-
sented, viewed, and controlled”—regardless of whether the scandal involves 
group or individual conduct (p. 237). 
Individual scandals most often involve money (p. 172). But sex scandals 
also occur—and, luckily for West—are common in Japan. Unlike in the 
United States, individual scandal generally involves persons who are already 
celebrities. West speculates that this reflects pro-plaintiff defamation rules, 
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and that the media do not want to be sued by “ordinary Joes” (which would 
make the media look far worse than when they are sued by celebrities) 
(pp. 226–228). And even in areas such as adultery, scandals are often not 
about the individual: the scandal often results from the individual’s attach-
ment to a group. 
Also in contrast to the United States, sex scandals in Japan are not about 
honesty; they are about unsettled norms governing sex and gender in 
Japanese society and in the legal system (p. 284). It is in such areas, West 
suggests, that scandal perhaps plays its most crucial role: scandal introduces 
debate over unsettled norms and provides a mechanism to begin a discus-
sion about what type of conduct is and is not acceptable.  
Japanese scandals frequently end with a “ritual of remorse, resignations, 
and occasionally redemption” (p. 285). There are signs, however, of a less-
ening in the importance of apology in Japanese scandal. West notes that 
politicians who commit wrongdoing in Japan frequently resign, but they do 
not always apologize. And many apologies in Japan come on behalf of the 
group: “The persons who perform the representative apologies are not nec-
essarily the most remorseful; rather, they are the ones who are in the best 
position . . . to do so” (p. 323).  
In conclusion, West returns to the interaction of law and scandal. “[O]ne 
development that often follows modern scandal is the enactment of rules to 
combat the evil that is assumed to have caused” the scandal (p. 325). These 
changes include corporate law reforms in reaction to corporate scandals, or 
the creation of freedom of information acts in response to government 
cover-ups. According to West, although these laws often fail to work, they 
can raise the cost of future transgressions. The rush to legislate in response 
to scandal means that in some cases scandal encourages the creation of for-
mal legal rules to replace the former informal norms. But the more 
important role of scandal may be outside the formal legal context, in helping 
to foster discussion of changing social norms and “issues that might other-
wise have gone untouched, especially on taboo topics like sex” (p. 326). 
Scandal “controls outliers”; it also shapes “informal social control” (p. 326).  
Sex, Scandal and Spectacle is important reading for anyone with an in-
terest in Japan, the media, or scandal. It also sets a benchmark for those 
seeking to understand how scandal works in a comparative context. And it is 
a great read: West’s knowledge of Japanese and American culture is stun-
ning (and at times a bit overwhelming), and he clearly delights in unraveling 
many of the intricate and (to Americans without significant prior exposure 
to Japan) quirky details of Japanese popular and political culture.  
B. Comparative Scandology 
What does scandal in Japan (and the United States) tell us about how we 
understand scandal—or the relationships among laws, media structure, and 
culture—in other parts of the world? West is careful not to draw expansive 
conclusions; his message is to pay attention to (and celebrate) the nuances in 
law, politics, and culture that contribute to scandal. West’s goal, as he states 
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in his final sentence, is to highlight “subtle distinctions in incentives, rela-
tionships, egos, taboos, and perversions that make secrets, sex, and spectacle 
in both [Japan and the United States] a bit less mysterious” (p. 329). Under-
standing the rules—both informal and legal—helps to explain trends in 
scandals that “might otherwise seem arbitrary and contradictory” (p. 328). 
West makes no claim to be broadly comparative; with a few exceptions, he 
limits his discussion to analysis of scandal in the United States and Japan. 
This is understandable; his book shows that scandal can only be understood 
by exploring the players that contribute to scandal and the legal and cultural 
backdrop in which scandal occurs. Japan is worthy of study not just because 
it offers salacious scandals; it also offers an opportunity to see how scandal 
plays out in a liberal democratic system that differs in many crucial cultural 
and institutional respects from the United States.  
Yet this conclusion is also moderately disappointing. One of West’s 
goals is to expand the literature of scandal beyond the countries most often 
examined by scandologists—the United States and the United Kingdom. 
West’s book is thus also a call for other comparativists to take up the chal-
lenge of exploring scandal in a comparative context. West has set a high 
standard for future scandologists, but he has offered little methodological 
guidance for facilitating the work of future students of scandal. And he has 
perhaps not quite captured what it is about scandal that makes it not only 
fun but also important in Japan and elsewhere. 
II. Scandal in China 
The remainder of this Review accepts West’s challenge by examining 
scandal in China. In some respects, China is not an ideal candidate for a 
comparison: it is a nondemocratic system with a controlled press, and it is at 
an earlier stage of economic development than is Japan (or the United 
States). Chinese scandal develops in a system in which the media remain 
unfree; Japanese scandal is the product of media that are at times wildly 
free. Yet China is also appealing to scandologists: scandal appears to be in-
creasingly common and is widely reported, and provides insights into how 
both the Chinese political system and Chinese society are evolving. Rules 
governing scandal in China exist, but they are in flux: China’s propaganda 
authorities struggle to monitor and control a widening range of media out-
lets as the media increasingly compete to attract readers and viewers. 
Despite the obvious differences, examining scandal in China yields insights 
that are in some ways similar to those West provides regarding Japan. China 
also offers a useful test for West’s argument in a political and cultural envi-
ronment that differs radically from that of either the United States or Japan.  
I make no claim to offering a more defined theoretical framework for 
understanding scandal than does West. But scandal in China demonstrates 
the usefulness of a broader comparative framework for examining both how 
scandal differs in varied social and political contexts, and also the impor-
tance of scandal as a tool for understanding changing political and social 
norms. Comparing China with Japan also highlights both the institutional 
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factors that contribute to scandal creation and the positive and negative ef-
fects that scandal may have in a society undergoing rapid change. This Part 
first describes who makes scandal in China; it then proceeds to discuss 
Chinese definitions of scandal; and finally, it examines three categories of 
contemporary Chinese scandal. 
A. Who Makes Scandal in China? 
For much of the past fifty years, scandal in China has been a political 
tool: scandals existed and were covered in the official media, but most often 
were preselected by Communist Party propaganda authorities. The role of 
scandal was limited in a society in which the state controlled most aspects 
of individuals’ lives and exercised near complete control over the media. 
Scandal served as a tool to discredit, and in some cases literally destroy, 
those who had fallen out of political favor. Yet scandal is not a modern in-
vention: China has a long tradition of news spreading by rumor, what is 
known in Chinese as xiaodao xiaoxi, or “back alley news.”  
Two factors have created a new framework for scandal in China. First, 
state control over individuals’ lives and the economy has loosened dramati-
cally since the reform era began in 1978. Second, the commercialization of 
the Chinese media over the past fifteen years has resulted in still state-
owned media now competing fiercely to attract readers.2 As a result, for the 
first time since 1949, China now has scandal that is not explicitly political 
and is not pre-selected or pre-cleared by propaganda officials. Nevertheless, 
the role of Party propaganda authorities remains crucial. In some cases 
scandals continue to be carefully managed by Party officials. In others, cen-
sors take control of scandal after it emerges. The important new 
development is that scandal can also emerge independently, forcing officials 
to react to and manage it—rather than predetermine how a scandal will play 
out. Scandals on less sensitive topics, such as celebrity misconduct, are 
permitted to run, sometimes for extended periods, without official interven-
tion.  
B. Defining Chinese Scandal 
What is scandalous in China? The answer depends in part of how scan-
dal is defined in Chinese. The most common term for scandal in Chinese is 
chouwen (丑闻), literally “ugly news” or “shameful news.” Yet the main-
                                                                                                                      
 2. In most Chinese cities, a number of commercialized newspapers, often tabloids, now 
compete for readers. I discuss the structure and commercialization of the Chinese media, and the 
growth of sensational reporting, in more detail elsewhere. See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, 
Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1 passim 
(2005). The Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department monitors the Chinese media, issu-
ing instructions regarding taboo topics and punishing individuals and media outlets that violate such 
norms. Id. at 43–44. Propaganda departments at the provincial and municipal level likewise oversee 
media within their jurisdictions. Id. 
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stream official media in China generally avoid mentioning the term,3 or use 
the term primarily in reports about scandal outside of China.4 This does not 
mean there are no reports on scandal in the Chinese media. Mainstream me-
dia often use the term shijian (事件), or “incident,” to refer to domestic 
scandals, in particular those with political overtones.5 The Chinese blog-
sphere, however, includes extensive discussion of scandal, including at least 
one site, Chouwen.com.cn, devoted to the collection of scandal stories from 
throughout China. Most stories on the site are sexual: of the ten stories 
viewed during one visit, eight concerned sex.6 Yet the site also includes re-
ports on topics that may be understood to be political—with the terms 
shijian and heimu (“black curtain”) being used in addition to chouwen.7 
Nevertheless, as a general rule the Chinese media use “shijian” to discuss 
domestic scandal, reserving the more pejorative “chouwen” for foreign 
scandals. In the discussion that follows, however, I adhere to West’s defini-
tion of scandal. 
C. A Typology of Chinese Scandals 
Most Chinese scandals appear to concern either money or sex—topics 
that would be common fodder for scandal in both Japan and the United 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Bloggers make this point explicitly. See, e.g., Posting of Zhongguo Meiyou Chouwen 
[China Has No Scandal] by Ying Fu Ji Jin to http://bmw977.blog.hexun.com/4125584_d.html (June 
12, 2006, 13:19:04) (arguing that the print and television media in China avoid the term chouwen). 
 4. See, e.g., Posting of Meiguo Can Zhong Yiyuan Baochu Jingtian Da Chouwen [Huge 
Scandals Were Exposed Concerning Both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United 
States] to Meiguo Chouwen Wang [American Scandal Website], http://meiguochouwen.blogspot.com/ 
2007/03/blog-post_2575.html (Mar. 4, 2007, 05:39); Posting of Meiguo Jun Yiyuan Dui Shangbin 
Jiuzhi Buli, Lujun Buzhang Cizhi [Troops Wounded Were Receiving Substandard Medical Treat-
ment At the Army’s Hospital, The Secretary of the Army Resigned] to Meiguo Chouwen Wang 
[American Scandal Website], http://meiguochouwen.blogspot.com/2007/03/blog-post_05.html (Mar. 
5, 2007, 01:35); Posting of Qiwen Gongshang—2006 Nian Meiguo De Renquan Jilu (2006 Chou-
wen Jizhong) [Sharing of Interesting Articles—The 2006 Human Rights Record of the United States 
(Collection of 2006 Scandals)] to Meiguo Chouwen Wang [American Scandal Website], 
http://meiguochouwen.blogspot.com/2007/03/3480.html (Mar. 8, 2007, 04:31); Posting of [Zhuan 
Tie] Qingwen Xiao Bushi, Shui Dou Yongdao Nali Qule? [[Reprinted] Question To Little Bush: 
Where Have All the Taxes Gone?] to Meiguo Chouwen Wang [American Scandal Website], 
http://meiguochouwen.blogspot.com/2007/03/blog-post_19.html (Mar. 19, 2007, 02:55); Sina.com, 
Ximenzi Xinghui Chouwen Manyan [Siemens Bribery Scandal Grows], http://finance.sina.com.cn/ 
focus/xmzhl/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Sohu.com, Yiselie Zongtong Xianru Xing Chouwen 
Xuanwo [Israel President Is Trapped in Sexual Scandals], http://news.sohu.com/s2006/ 
2006yiseliezongtong/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Chouwen Baoguang Dachen Cizhi, Anbei Neige 
Youzao Zhongchuang [Minister Resigns After the Exposure of Scandals, Abe Shinzo’s Cabinet Is 
Seriously Injured Again], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], Dec. 28, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
world/2006-12/28/content_5540871.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 5. See, e.g., [Zhujing Zhuandian] Shanghaishi Fu Shizhang: Chen Liangyu Weifa Weigui 
Shijian Bing Wu Sheji Shanghai Shibohui [[Special Report from Beijing] Shanghai Vice-Mayor: The 
Incident Concerning Chen Liangyu Violating Laws and Regulations Did Not Involve the  
Shanghai World Expo], Wang Yi [Net Ease], July 31, 2007, http://money.163.com/07/0731/18/ 
3KOIM30R002529IP.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 6. Chouwen.com.cn, http://www.chouwen.com.cn/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 7. It is difficult to assess the impact of the site, but the widespread discussion of scandal on 
blogs suggests that blogs are playing an important role in furthering discussion of scandal in China. 
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States. Yet scandals in China evolve and develop in ways that reflect the 
political context in which the Chinese media operate. Examining recent 
Chinese scandals suggests that Chinese scandals can be roughly divided into 
three types: explicitly political scandals, scandals involving individual rights 
violations or misconduct by minor officials, and scandals involving celebri-
ties. This typology is not rigid; as the discussion that follows shows, 
scandals in the second category often are or become politicized. The three 
categories of scandal, however, operate according to very different rules: 
political scandals are most carefully managed, and rarely develop on their 
own; scandals concerning rights violations and minor misconduct frequently 
develop from the media, and then are subsequently subject to official man-
agement and oversight; celebrity scandal is generally permitted to develop 
and run without interference from China’s censors.  
1. Political Scandal: Chen Liangu and the Shanghai Pension Fund 
Explicitly political scandals continue to be generated and managed by 
Central Party-state authorities. Chinese political scandals most often involve 
allegations of corruption8 and rarely touch prominent officials; scandals 
emerge only after an official determination has been made that an individual 
should be punished. Scandal involving even midlevel officials continues to 
be carefully controlled by propaganda officials. When prominent officials 
become the focus of scandal, it generally means that the target has fallen out 
of political favor.  
The most significant political scandal in China in the past decade was 
the 2006 fall from power of Chen Liangyu, formerly the Communist Party 
Secretary in Shanghai, over allegations of corruption concerning Shanghai’s 
pension fund. Chen had been a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, 
making him one of the twenty-four most powerful people in China.9 The 
scandal, which involved widespread misuse of the pension fund, followed a 
pattern that is the norm for scandal involving high-ranking officials: coverage 
was carefully stage-managed, with most reports following what appeared to 
be a pre-approved script.10 Once the wrongdoing had been exposed, reports 
                                                                                                                      
 8. Allegations of sexual misconduct are sometimes tacked on for good measure.  
 9. Zhonggong Zhongyang Jueding Dui Chen Liangyu Yanzhong Weiji Wenti Li’an Diaocha 
[The Central Committee of The Communist Party of China Decides to Investigate Chen Liangyu’s 
Serious Violations of Discipline], Sina.com, Sept. 25, 2006, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-09-
25/125810104268s.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 10. The language used in reports in major news outlets was extremely similar. See, e.g., 
CCTV, Shanghai Shebao Jijin’an Neimu [Inside Information on the Shanghai Social Security Fund 
Case], http://law.cctv.com/special/C16662/01/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Dongfang 
Wang [Eastday Website], Zhongyang Jueding Kaichu Chen Liangyu Dangji, Gongzhi [The Central 
Committee of Communist Party of China Decided to Expel Chen Liangyu From the Communist 
Party and Discharge Chen Liangyu From His Public Post], http://sh.eastday.com/dta/node17183/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Renmin Wang [People’s Daily Online], Zhongyang Jueding 
Dui Chen Liangyu Li’an Jiancha [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Decided 
to Investigate Chen Liangyu], http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/71631/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2008); Zhonggong Zhongyang Jueding Dui Chen Liangyu Yanzhong Weiji Wenti Li’an 
Diaocha, supra note 9. 
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quickly turned from describing Chen’s wrongdoing to emphasizing the role 
of central authorities in fighting corruption.  
Yet the scandal also suggested some of the ways in which coverage of 
scandal is changing in China. Although it did not break news of Chen’s in-
volvement in the scandal, a leading financial publication, Caijing Magazine 
(albeit one widely believed to have strong links to some central Party offi-
cials—suggesting that the report might have been pre-authorized), broke 
news of the detention by Party anticorruption investigators of the director of 
the Shanghai Labor and Social Security Bureau.11 The report placed the cor-
ruption probe in the public eye, and appeared to result in pressure on 
authorities to resolve the case. A string of higher-ranking officials were sub-
sequently detained, including Chen two months later. 12  Thus although 
central authorities controlled news of the scandal, they did so under in-
creased media scrutiny. Nevertheless, the scandal was largely controlled and 
managed by Central Propaganda officials and likely by the Politburo itself. 
The scandal became a scandal due to decisions by senior Party officials: 
international media and even some commentators on domestic chatrooms 
viewed the decision to sack Chen as reflecting a power struggle at the high-
est reaches of Party power.13 
2. Autonomous Scandal: Brick Kilns, Fake Dumplings,  
and a Naked Party Secretary  
A second group of scandals involves reports that focus either on rights 
violations or on misconduct by minor officials. The most significant aspect 
of such scandals is that they emerge from the media, often from commercial 
tabloids or internet sites. In contrast to more overtly political scandals, cov-
erage is not initially managed or controlled by propaganda authorities. Such 
cases often result from aggressive media reporting, and sometimes lead not 
only to punishment for the wrongdoers, but also to legal or policy changes 
designed to address underlying social problems. Yet once such scandals be-
come major news, they often also generate a backlash from Party officials, 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Fu Tao, Shanghai Laodong He Shehui Baozhangju Juzhang Zhu Junyi 
Bei “Shuangkai” [The Director of Shanghai Labor and Social Security Bureau, Zhu Junyi, was 
Subject to “Double Specified”], Caijing [Caijing Magazine], July 24, 2006, available at http:// 
www.caijing.com.cn/newcn/fortnight/2006-07-24/9928.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 12. Yang Jinzhi, Shanghai Shebao Zijin An Jiuming She’an Dangyuan Ganbu Bei Shuangkai 
[Nine Party Member Officials Involved In the Shanghai Pension Fund Case Were “Double Ex-
pelled”], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], March 2, 2007, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070302/01153369083.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2008); Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Jueding Dui Chen Liangyu Tongzhi Yanzhong Weiji Wenti Li’an Jiancha [The Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China Decided to Investigate Comrade Chen Liangyu’s Seri-
ous Violation of Discipline], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], Sept. 25, 2006, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-09/25/content_5134888.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 13. See, e.g., Top China leader fired for graft, BBC News, Sept. 25, 2006, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5376858.stm (last visited Jan. 4, 2008); Ynet.com Chatroom, http:// 
bbs.ynet.com/viewthread.php?tid=452227&extra=&page=2 (last visited Jan. 7, 2008) (a domestic 
chatroom where people viewed the scandal as reflecting an intraparty power struggle).  
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leading to a cessation of reporting on the topic. Three recent cases highlight 
this trend. 
In June 2007 domestic and international media in China extensively 
covered the existence in Shanxi province of numerous illegal brick kilns, in 
which migrant workers were essentially forced to work as slaves. Although 
an earlier television report in Henan Province (home of many of the migrant 
workers) had discussed the case,14 the slave labor scandal exploded to  
national prominence in China with the publication of an online report, The 
Evil Road to the “Illegal People!!” The Bleeding Pleas from 400 Parents 
Whose Children Were Sold to the Illegal Brick Kilns in Shanxi, on the web-
site of the Dahe News, a leading mass-market (and Party-owned) newspaper 
in Henan.15 After the Dahe News report, the Shanxi Evening News quickly 
carried a follow-up report on the case.16 A public opinion tsunami ensued. 
Numerous other websites subsequently reprinted the Dahe News report;17 
news also spread quickly to the international media.18  
Numerous reports in the online and print media detailed the plight of the 
enslaved workers, and raised questions of how widespread the practice was. 
They described how children were sold into slave labor and recorded that 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Video clip, Zui’e De “Heiren” Zhilu (Xu Ba) [The Evil Road to the “Illegal People”—
the 8th in a series] (Renmin Wang Henan Shichuang [Henan Related Videos at People’s Daily 
Online] 2007), available at http://www.hnsc.com.cn/news/2007/06/14/182461.htm (last visited Jan. 
7, 2008).  
 15. Wang Wei, 400 Ge Henan Haizi Beimai Shanxi Zhuanyao, 400 Wei Fuqin Qixue Hujiu 
[400 Henan Children Were Sold to Shanxi Brick Kilns, 400 Fathers Bleedingly Cry for Help  
for Rescue], Souhu Xinwen [Sohu News], June 8, 2007, http://news.sohu.com/20070608/ 
n250464334.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 16. Li Tingzhen, Hei Zhuanchang Li, Tamen Guozhe “Nuli” Shenghuo [They Are Having 
“Slaves” Live in Black Brick Kilns], Shanxi Xinwen Wang [Shanxi News Online], June 7, 
2007, http://www.daynews.com.cn/news/dsxw/224665.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 17. See, e.g., 400 Fuqin Qixue Hujiu, Shangqian Haizi Shanxi Zuo “Nuli” [400 Fathers 
Bleedingly Cry for Help for Rescue, Thousands of Children Became “Slaves” In Shanxi], Tianfu 
Zaobao [Tianfu Morning Post], June 14, 2007, http://cn.news.yahoo.com/070614/1014/ 
2iax1.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); 400 Ge Henan Haizi Beimai Shanxi Zhuanyao, 400 Wei Fuqin 
Qixue Hujiu [400 Henan Children Were Sold to Shanxi Brick Kilns, 400 Fathers Bleedingly Cry for 
Help for Rescue], Huashang Wang [Huash.com], June 8, 2007, http://news.huash.com/2007-
06/08/content_6332706.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); 400 Haizi Beimai Shanxi Zhuanyao, 400 Wei 
Fuqin Qixue Hujiu [400 Henan Children Were Sold to Shanxi Brick Kilns, 400 Fathers Bleedingly 
Cry for Help for Rescue], Shenzhen Xinwen Wang [Shenzhen News Online], June 8, 2007, 
http://www.sznews.com/news/content/2007-06/08/content_1222895.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); 
Wang Wei, supra note 15; 400 Wei Fuqin Fachu Qixue Hujiu: Jiujiu Women De Haizi! [400 Fathers 
Bleedingly Cry for Help: Rescue Our Children!], Wang Yi [Net Ease], June 7, 2007, 
http://news.163.com/07/0607/06/3GC6O3OG0001124J.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Posting  
of linxy06 to http://www.tianya.cn/new/publicforum/Content.asp?idWriter=0&Key=0&strItem= 
free&idArticle=926643&flag=1 (June 7, 2007, 11:20:00). 
 18. See Bai Maike [Michael Bristow], Shanxi Gong’an Jiuchu Zhuanchang “Nuligong” 
[Shanxi Public Security Agency Rescued Brick Kiln “Slave Labor”], BBC Zhongwen Wang [BBC 
Chinese Online], June 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_6730000/newsid 
_6733400/6733471.stm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Jingxin Dongpo: Zhongguo Hei Zhuanyao Nuyi 
Laogong Tonggong Heimu Zhengzai Jiekai [Heartquake: The Black Curtain Is Being Lifted Con-
cerning The Enslaving of Labor And Child Labor By Chinese Black Brick Kilns], Deutsche 
Welle, June 14, 2007, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2609412,00.html (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2008). 
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some workers were beaten to death.19 Media reports exposed allegations that 
only two of the of ninety-three brick kilns operating in Hongdong County, 
the center of the scandal, were operating legally, and that the reporter who 
broke the story had received numerous threats.20 Many noted that hundreds 
of children were missing, presumed to have been sold into forced labor. Lo-
cal authorities had originally tipped off the media about the scandal with the 
apparent hope of generating positive coverage of their efforts to solve the 
problem.21 But the attempt failed: media accounts were scathing in their por-
trayal of the local authorities.22 Reports stated that “the labor supervision 
department was suspected of selling child labor,”23 questioned “why the lo-
cal government had not apologized until the central government 
intervened,”24 and criticized the police for failing to help to find missing 
children.25 The initial reports came in a commercialized paper that is known 
for its hard-hitting reports. But Party mouthpiece newspapers also joined in 
the coverage, with the Party’s flagship, People’s Daily, issuing an article 
“Black Brick Kilns Incident” that questioned the actions of the local gov-
ernment.”26  
                                                                                                                      
 19. Zhu Hongjun, Shaonian Xuelei Pujiu Heigong Zhilu, Yujin Jingfang Yunniang Lianshou 
Jiejiu [Youth’s Blood and Tears Build a Road of Illegal Labor, Police in Henan and Shanxi Plan to 
Cooperate to Rescue], Nanfang Zhoumo [S. Weekend], June 14, 2007, http:// 
www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20070614/xw/tb/200706140002.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 20. Li Ningyuan, Pilu Hei Zhuanyao Diyiren Fu Zhenzhong: Wo Keneng Zhishao Re Le 
Jiwan Ren [Fu Zhenzhong, The First Man Who Disclosed the Illegal Brick Kilns: I May Have Irri-
tated at Least Several Tens of Thousands of People], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News 
Agency Online], June 21, 2007, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/sh/news/2007/06-21/962360.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 21. Ma Changbo, Fengbao Yanzhong De Shanxi Guanyuan [Shanxi Officials In The Eye of 
the Storm], Nanfang Zhoumo [S. Weekend], July 5, 2007, http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/ 
20070705/xw/tb/200707050002.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 22. Xiong Peiyun, Heiyao Shijian Zen Bujian Youren Cizhi [Why Didn’t Anyone Resign for 
the Black Brick Kiln Incident], Sina.com, June 18, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/pl/2007-06-
18/081213252577.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Zhang Liwei, Chengfa Duzhi Guanyuan Yi 
Quxin Yumin [Officials Must Be Punished For Their Dereliction of Duty So That People’s 
Trust Can Be Obtained], Sina.com, June 16, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/pl/2007-06-16/ 
102013243394.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 23. Shanxi Heiyao Shijian Xu: Laojian Bumen She Daomai Tonggong [Shanxi Black Brick 
Kiln Incident Continued: Labor Supervision Department Was Involved in the Sale of Child Workers], 
Teng Xun Wang [QQ.com], June 13, 2007, http://news.qq.com/a/20070613/001184.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 24. Sun Ruizhuo, Weihe Jingdong Le Zhongyang, Difang Zhengfu Cai Xiangqi Daoqian 
[Why Local Government Did Not Make Any Apologies Until the Central Government Was Alerted], 
Teng Xun Wang [QQ.com], June 15, 2007, http://news.qq.com/a/20070615/000230.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 25. Shanxi Hei Zhuanyao Shijian Xu: Jingyuan Cheng Bubang Jiazhang Cha Shizong Haizi 
[Shanxi Black Brick Kiln Incident Continued: Police Refused To Help Parents Find Their  
Missing Children], Wang Yi [Net Ease], June 14, 2007, http://news.163.com/07/0614/03/ 
3GTUTJ1C0001124J.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 26. Wu Yan, “Hei Zhuanyao Shijian” Zhuiwen Jiceng Zhengfu [“Black Brick Kiln Incident” 
Questions Local Government], Teng Xun Wang [QQ.com], June 15, 2007, http://news.qq.com/a/ 
20070615/000702.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
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Widespread media coverage resulted in nearly immediate Central Party-
state intervention in the case. Brick kiln operators who had used forced la-
bor were quickly arrested, with dozens of kiln operators and their employees 
being tried and sentenced, in some cases to death or life imprisonment. 
More than ninety-five local officials were punished in the first two  
months after the scandal became public.27 Following central government  
intervention in the case, however, the tone of coverage shifted; the media 
issued (mostly positive) reports about central authorities’ efforts to resolve 
the problems.28 And the scandal disappeared from the official media nearly 
as quickly as it emerged. After the conclusion of an official investigation 
into the incident was announced on August 13, 2007—just over two months 
after the scandal broke—the official media largely stopped discussing the 
case.29  
The brick kiln scandal represents a relatively new phenomenon in China: 
scandal concerning major social issues that emerges from the commercial-
ized (but still Party-led) media. Central authorities subsequently took 
control of management of the scandal, shifting the tone of reports from ex-
posing wrongdoing to noting how, under the leadership of central 
authorities, the scandal was resolved and those responsible punished.30 
                                                                                                                      
 27. Bao Dan, Shanxi Di Er Pi “Hei Zhuanyao An” Xuanpan, Yipi Guanyuan Huoxing [The 
Second Batch of Sentencing Regarding the Shanxi “Black Brick Kiln Case” Was Announced, A 
Bunch Of Officials Were Sentenced], Wang Yi [Net Ease], Aug. 2, 2007, http://news.163.com/07/ 
0802/05/3KS8BOBE0001124J.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). One of the most detailed accounts of 
the scandal ran in Southern Weekend on July 5, a month into the scandal. A full translation is avail-
able online at the EastSouthWestNorth Blog. Ma Changbo, The Shanxi Officials In The Eye Of The 
Storm, S. Weekend, July 5, 2007, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20070706_1.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2008). 
 28. See Hu Jintao Wen Jiabao Deng Dui Shanxi Hei Zhuanyao An Zuo Pishi [Hu Jintao, Wen 
Jiabao and Others Made Instructions Regarding the Shanxi Black Brick Kiln Case], Sina.com, June 
15, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-06-15/133213237961.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Li 
Tingzhen, Shanxi Hongdong Hei Zhuanyao Shichang Shijian Jingdong Zhongyang Gaoceng 
[Shanxi Hongdong Black Brick Kiln Incident Alerted Central Leaders], Teng Xun Wang 
[QQ.com], June 14, 2007, http://view.news.qq.com/a/20070615/000007.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2008).  
 29. Major Chinese web portals that had previously covered the case in detail contain few 
reports about the case after August 14. See, e.g., Sina.com, Shanxi Hei Zhuanchang Nüedai Gongren 
[Shanxi Black Brick Kilns Abuse Laborers], http://news.sina.com.cn/z/shanximaltreat/index.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Sohu.com, Shanxi Hongdong Hei Zhuanyao An [Shanxi Hongdong Black 
Brick Kiln Case], http://news.sohu.com/s2007/heizhuanyao/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Teng Xun 
Wang [QQ.com], Shanxi De Hei Zhuanyao You Duo Hei [How Black Were the Shanxi Black Brick 
Kilns?], http://view.news.qq.com/zt/2007/zhuanyao/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 30. See, e.g., Liu Zheng & Gao Feng, Shanxi Hei Zhuanyao Shijian Jizhong Diaocha Chuli 
Gongzuo Jiben Jieshu [The Concentrated Investigation and Handling Work Has Generally Been 
Completed Concerning the Shanxi “Black Brick Kiln” Incident], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News 
Agency Online], Aug. 13, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2007-08/13/content_ 
6526740.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Shanxi Hei Yao An 69 Ming Sheji Fanzuizhe Bei Sifa Jiguan 
Qisu [69 Suspects Involved in the Shanxi Black Brick Kiln Case Were Prosecuted by Judicial Agen-
cies], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Agency Online], Aug. 13, 2007, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2007-08-13/153613653359.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). However, 
no officials above the county level were sanctioned. Thus, responsibility for the scandal was placed 
on the shoulders of local officials. Yu Youjun: Hei Zhuanyao Shijian Dui Shizhi Duzhi Ganbu Chuli 
Yanli [Yu Youjun: Officials Involved in the Black Brick Kiln Incident Were Seriously Punished for 
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Nevertheless, the scandal itself did not originate with the government; it was 
the product of risk-taking journalists and editors operating at the boundaries 
of what is permissible in the Chinese media.  
Yet scandals in this category do not always result in greater media 
autonomy: they can also lead to new restrictions on the media, as evidenced 
by a second recent scandal, the “fake dumpling case.” On July 8, 2007, fol-
lowing a wave of international reports questioning food safety in China, 
Beijing Television carried an investigative report showing a street vendor 
stuffing dumplings with cardboard softened by caustic soda and flavored by 
pig fat.31 The allegations resonated with widespread concerns about food 
safety in China and caused a sensation on the Internet. Reports quickly 
spread to both the domestic and international press.32 Eight days later, how-
ever, Beijing municipal health department officials announced that the story 
was fake: the reporter had paid the vendor and provided the raw materials in 
order to create a sensational story.33 The reporter was arrested, fined, and 
sentenced to a year in prison—according to some sources the first time a 
reporter had been sent to prison for fabricating news.34  
In the official media, this was the end of the story, although it provided a 
basis for extensive discussion of the problem of fake news and low journal-
istic standards.35 In the official media, the scandal was the misdeeds of the 
rogue journalist. But the story likely resonated with the public because, 
even if untrue, it touched on an issue of popular concern—food safety. 
Despite official statements that the story was false, it continued to thrive 
on the Internet: bloggers debated whether the health department account 
                                                                                                                      
Their Dereliction of Duty and Malfeasance], Zhongguo Wang [China Online], Oct. 20, 2007, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-10-20/225414130954.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 31. See “Zhixian Baozi” Shijian Huifang [The Recalling of the Cardboard Stuffing Dump-
ling Incident], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], July 19, 2007, http:// 
news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2007-07/19/content_6400870.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). 
 32. See American Morning (CNN television broadcast July 13, 2007), transcript available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0707/13/ltm.01.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2008); Arrests 
After the Bun Scandal (BBC News online broadcast July 12, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/ 
nol/newsid_6890000/newsid_6896500/6896514.stm?bw=nb&mp=wm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008); 
BTV: “Zhixian Baozi” Wei Xujia Baodao [“The Cardboard Stuffing Dumpling News” Was a Fake 
News Report], Xin Jing Bao [The Beijing News], July 19, 2007, http://news.thebeijingnews.com/ 
0558/2007/07-19/015@277353.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). 
 33. Liu Puquan, Jingcheng “Zhixian Baozi” Jia Xinwen Chulong Qianhou [The Before-and-
After of the Production of the Fake News Concerning the “Cardboard Stuffing Dumpling” in the 
Capital City], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], July 19, 2007, http://news.qq.com/ 
a/20070719/003486.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 34. Zan Aizong, “Zhibaozi” Beihou Zhenxiang Diaocha [Investigation of the Truth Behind 
the “Cardboard Stuffing Dumplings”], 21CN Xinwen Wang [21CN News Online], Aug. 14, 
2007, http://news.21cn.com/today/zhuanlan/2007/08/14/3413208.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 35. See Chuanmei Shalong: Xinwen Zhenshixing Yu Meiti Zilü [Media Salon: Truthfulness of 
News and Self-Discipline of Media], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], Apr. 19, 
2007, http://www.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/zhibo/20070419/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); 
Guangming Shiping: Xinwen Meiti, Zhenshi Shi Shengming [Commentary from Guangming Daily: 
Truth Is the Life of News Media], Guangming Ribao [Guangming Daily], July 20, 2007, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2007-07/20/content_6404117.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
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was correct, with some alleging a cover-up.36 Comments online also sug-
gested widespread public distrust of health department claims regarding the 
safety of China’s food supply.37  
The fake dumpling story, like the brick kiln story, reveals the important 
role of the Internet in scandal in China: it is increasingly difficult for propa-
ganda authorities to make scandals disappear. Yet they still try. Less than 
one month after the official conclusion of the fake dumpling case, propa-
ganda officials launched a campaign against “fake news”—an effort that 
was widely interpreted in the West as an attempt to rein in the media in ad-
vance of the 2008 Olympics.38 The official media did not explicitly tie the 
crackdown on fake reports to the dumpling scandal, but the link was obvi-
ous. Thus what began as a scandal concerning a (perhaps fake) story about 
dumplings contributed to an official crackdown on wayward journalists and 
potentially on media freedom more generally. The case suggests the limits 
to the influence of scandal in China: in some cases scandal may force au-
thorities to redress problems; in others, however, excessive reporting may 
lead to an official backlash and hasty declarations that the alleged misdeeds 
were fabricated or have been addressed.  
Scandals in this category also sometimes included direct (and often sen-
sational) reports on misconduct by low-ranking officials. Scandals regarding 
minor officials may develop without prior approval of propaganda officials; 
such scandals may also permit indirect discussion of problems of official 
misconduct more generally. As with the prior examples, however, journalists 
who create such reports risk retaliation. The case of the “Naked Party Secre-
tary” emerged from non-official media, rather than from an official decision 
of Party officials. But in the end it also revealed just how careful the media 
must be when reporting on even low level official misconduct. 
The Naked Party Secretary scandal began with a report on a minor (and 
apparently privately run) website in Hangzhou that was subsequently re-
printed in Southern Metropolitan News, a major mass-market newspaper in 
                                                                                                                      
 36. See Posting of Zhixian Xinwen [Cardboard Stuffing News] to http:// 
chenxiaoshou.tianyablog.com/blogger/post_show.asp?idWriter=0&Key=0&PostID=10380167&Blo
gID=1037511 (July 21, 2007); Posting of Nali Haiyou Yifang Jingtu? [Where Lies a Pure Land?] to 
http://www.cnadtop.com/blog/blogdetail.asp?id=1311&uid=26761 (July 25, 2007); Posting of Dui 
Dajia De Dajia—Guanyu Zhibaozi De Shi [The Crackdown on the Crackdown on Fake Things—
Regarding the Cardboard Stuffing Dumplings] to http://cache.tianya.cn/publicforum/Content/ 
develop/1/123304.shtml (July 21, 2007). 
 37. Han Yonghong, Minjian Huaiyi: Daodi Baozi Jia Haishi Xinwen Jia? Zhongguo Zhengfu 
Miandui Gongxin Weiji [Public Doubt: Whether It Is the Dumpling or the News that Is Fake? The 
Chinese Government Is Facing a Credibility Crisis], United Morning Post, July 22, 2007, at 14, 
available at http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/cnpol/pages/cnpol070722a.html (last visited Jan. 
7, 2008); Posting of Zhixiang Baozi Shi Jia Xinwen? Shui Haigan Xiangxin Meiti? [The Cardboard 
Stuffing Dumpling News Is Fake News? Who Dares Trust the News Media Anymore?] to 
http://blog.people.com.cn/blog/log/showlog.jspe?log_id=1184804042253227&site_id=27019 (July 
19, 2007 8:14:02) (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 38. Sui Xiaofei, Woguo Kaizhan Zhengzhi Jiabao Jia Jizhezhan Jia Jizhe Jia Xinwen 
Zhuanxiang Huodong [Our Nation Lauches a Compaign Against Fake Newspapers, Fake Corre-
spondent Stations, Fake Journalists and Fake News], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency 
Online], Aug. 15, 2007, available at http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/zybs/2007-08/15/content_ 
26421.htm (last visited February 18, 2008). 
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Guangdong Province. As translated by the EastSouthWestNorth blog,39 the 
original report recounted in satirical fashion the exploits of a local Party 
official who had apparently died of asphyxiation while having an affair in 
his car:  
Linan city Qingliangfeng town party secretary Xu Xinxian had been busy 
with performing public service and passed away due to physical exhaus-
tion in his car. Another excellent female cadre also laid down her life at the 
same time. According to information, the party secretary and the female 
cadre were discussing public business in a car. At the time, the car was out 
of gas and therefore the air conditioner was not working. Therefore, it was 
very hot inside in the car which was parked inside a garage. To relieve 
themselves from the heat, the two took off their clothes to continue dis-
cussing public business until they laid down their lives. The people of 
Qingliangfeng town are lucky to have such a responsible and good party 
secretary. This party secretary had worked hard for the people, and was 
performing work related to women right before he laid down his life. The 
people will remember his accomplishments in their hearts.40 
Word quickly spread to numerous other news websites in China, eventu-
ally being voted one of the “most humorous” reports of the year.41 Although 
some questioned the accuracy of the report, its veracity may have been be-
side the point: the scandal clearly touched a nerve with popular complaints 
regarding official wrongdoing. What followed for the website owner, how-
ever, reflected continued sensitivity to scandal that involves officials. Local 
Party officials ordered the report removed; police raided the offices of the 
website; and the website was shut down.42  
The Hangzhou Information Net did not go quietly. Before being shut-
down, the website ran a series of satirical corrections that had the effect of 
repeating the original allegations by denying them: one line of the initial 
correction stated that the deceased “was just an ordinary worker at the town, 
and not a Party cadre leader” and that he “was the only person present [at 
                                                                                                                      
 39. The Chinese language reports on the case have been removed from their original web-
sites, but the EastSouthWestNorth blog has reposted a number of them. EastSouthWestNorth: “The 
Nude Town Party Secretary Dropped Dead While on Duty”, http://zonaeuropa.com/ 
20070810_1.htm (Aug. 123, 2007 11:15:00) (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). They also continue to be 
available on some websites in China, see, for example, posting of Zhenshi Baodao Women Dang De 
Youxiu Ganbu De Xu Xinxian De Hangzhou Xinxi Wang Naqule? [Where Has The Hangzhou In-
formation Website that Truthfully Reported Xu Xinxian, the Excellent Cadre of Our Party, Gone?] 
to http://cache.tianya.cn/publicforum/Content/free/1/980179.shtml (Aug. 12, 2007), and Wangzhan 
Cheng Zhenwei Shuji Luosi Xiyin Gong Xisheng Zao Piping [Website Was Criticized for Stating that 
the Town Party Secretary Died Naked While on Duty], Nanfang Wang [S. News Online], Aug. 
10, 2007, http://news.163.com/07/0810/11/3LHGGQ1R0001124J.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 40. EastSouthWestNorth: “The Nude Town Party Secretary Dropped Dead While on Duty”, 
supra note 39.  
 41. Posting of Zhenshi Baodao Women Dang De Youxiu Ganbu De Xu Xinxian De Hang-
zhou Xinxi Wang Naqule?, supra note 39; Wangzhan Cheng Zhenwei Shuji Luosi Xiyin Gong 
Xisheng Zao Piping, supra note 39. 
 42. Edward Cody, For China’s Censors, Electronic Offenders Are the New Frontier, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 10, 2007, at A01. 
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his death]. He was fully clothed and not naked.”43 A later correction removed 
this language, but noted that the “incident is just a one-time-only rare phe-
nomenon. The majority of our party members and cadres are still good 
people. So we say the same thing: You must trust the organization and you 
must trust the Party.”44 And in a final parting shot before the website was 
taken offline, a notice implored readers to stop discussing the incident: 
“Please do not make a fuss over unique and rare cases of some grassroots 
party cadres, especially since this is only a lifestyle issue. It is a private mat-
ter which does not affect work and it is not criminal either. Why is this 
worthy of any discussion?”45 Although not as carefully managed as cases 
involving more senior officials, the case suggests both the appeal and the 
sensitivity of scandals involving minor officials. 
3. Celebrities—and Sex 
The third category of Chinese scandals involves celebrities, and usually 
sex.46 Here scandal serves primarily commercial purposes—of the media 
that report on the scandals and of the celebrities who are at the center of 
scandal (some of whom are already famous and some of whom become fa-
mous through the scandal). Although celebrity scandals also develop 
autonomously, unlike those in the second category of scandals they gener-
ally run without interference from propaganda authorities. 
One of the most prominent sex scandals in China in recent years in-
volves actress Zhang Yu’s allegations of “sex for roles,” also referred to as 
the “unspoken rules of show business.”47 In 2003, Zhang accused a number 
of famous directors of demanding sex with actresses in exchange for roles 
on television shows.48 In 2004, she provided audio of an actress having sex 
with a director.49 One of the directors she named as being involved in the 
                                                                                                                      
 43. EastSouthWestNorth: “The Nude Town Party Secretary Dropped Dead While on Duty”, 
supra note 39. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Political scandal, however, also frequently involves sex: in many cases reports on corrupt 
officials include details of their sexual transgressions, most often their taking of mistresses. In one 
notable recent case, online reports recounted how two officials had not only engaged in widespread 
corruption; they had also shared a mistress while doing so. Likewise, official reports have stated that 
ninety percent of officials found to be corrupt have had mistresses. 
 47. Liu Lin, Zhang Yu Jiang Gongbu “Qian Guize” Zhengju: You Taiduo Nühai Shangdang 
Shoupian [Zhang Yu will Publicize the Evidence of “Unspoken Rules”: Too Many Girls were 
Cheated], Beijing Yule Xinbao [Beijing Entertainment Information Newspaper], Nov. 16, 
2006, available at http://ent.tom.com/1306/1362/20061116-230872.html (last visited February 18, 
2008). 
 48. Zhang Yu Jiang Chongxin Qisu Huang Jianzhong, Ni Jiang Xing’ai Nan Zhujue Quanbu 
Gaodao [Zhang Yu Will Sue Huang Jianzhong Again and Intends to Sue All the Other Men Involved 
in the Sex Tapes], Xinmin Wan Bao [Xinmin Evening Post], Dec. 5, 2006, available at http:// 
ent.tom.com/2006-12-05/000E/04921520.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 49. Nü Yanyuan Chushi Zhengju, Zhuming Daoyan Huang Jianzhong Juanru Luyindai 
Chouwen? [Actress Furnished Evidence, Was Famous Director Huang Jianzhong Involved in Tape 
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scandal, Huang Jianzhong, then wrote an article detailing Zhang Yu’s own 
behavior. Zhang sued Huang for defamation—and lost.50 She then posted a 
videotape online that allegedly showed a director having sex with an actress. 
Zhang remains in the spotlight because she claims to have a collection of 
similar sex tapes that she releases intermittently on the internet.51  
Actress Hu Xiaoqiong subsequently joined the fray with her own story 
of trading sex for a role, which she posted to her blog.52 The director she 
named, Yang Yichao, subsequently sued her for defamation and won53—
although that did not silence Hu, who promptly posted the court decision on 
her blog.54 The Hu-Yang case resulted in extensive discussion of what con-
stitutes sexual harassment in chatrooms and blogs.55 It also appears to have 
made both actresses more famous—leading some to argue that they had 
achieved their primary goal. The scandals have continued to run without 
apparent interference from propaganda officials; scandals regarding celebri-
ties and leading sports figures may largely be reported by the media with 
autonomy. Indeed, even some prominent official media, including China 
Daily (the official English language paper) and both of China’s official news 
agencies, Xinhua and the China News Agency, have carried detailed reports 
on the sex-for-roles scandal.56 The case shows the increased willingness of 
Chinese commercial media to report on and market scandal, and how 
                                                                                                                      
Scandal?], Xin Jing Bao [The Beijing News], Dec. 29, 2003, available at http://ent.sina.com.cn/ 
s/m/2003-12-29/0838265108.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 50. Wu Qingcai & Guo Jinxia, Zhang Yu Gao Zhuming Daoyan Huang Jianzhong “Xing 
Chouwen” An Zhongshen Baisu [Zhang Yu Lost in the Final Judgment of the “Sexual Scandal” Case 
Against Famous Director Huang Jianzhong], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], Sept. 
12, 2006, http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-09/12/content_8015716.htm (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2008). 
 51. See Articles and News Reports Concerning the Zhang Yu “Sex for Roles” Scandal, 
http://ent.qq.com/zt/2006/zhangyusex/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); “Sex for roles” scandal in Chinese 
show business, Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 25, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-
09/25/content_5134218.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Sex, Lies And Videotape: Actress’ Disclosure, 
China.org.cn, Nov. 23, 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/entertainment/190666.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 52. The original blog posting is no longer available online. See Articles and News  
Reports Concerning the Hu Xiaoqiong “Sex for Roles” Scandal, http://datalib.ent.qq.com/star/ 
3879/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 53. See Huang Xiaoyu, Shouli Boke Qinquan An Zhongshen Panjue, Nü Yanyuan Xiaoqiong 
Baisu [The Final Judgment Was Issued in the First Blog Tort Lawsuit, Actress Xiaoqiong Lost the 
Case], Xinwen Wu Bao [Midday News], June 21, 2007, available at http://ent.sina.com.cn/ 
s/m/2007-06-21/15581607398.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 54. See Posting to Xiaoquiong de BLOG [Xiaoqiong’s Blog], http://blog.sina.com.cn/ 
s/blog_4a96709b010009rc.html (June 29, 2007, 11:59 CCT). She did, however, apparently comply 
with a court order instructing her to remove the defamatory article from her website. 
 55. See Discussions Concerning Sexual Harassment in Show Business, http:// 
space.phoenixtv.com/argue/PKManage.do?operate=viewpk&founderid=1&id=543 (last visited Jan. 
7, 2008); Posting of “Xing Anshi” Yu Yanyiquan “Qianguize” [“Sexual Hints” and The “Unspoken 
Rules” In the Show Business] to Tianya Shequ [Tianya Blog Website], http://cache.tianya.cn/ 
publicforum/Content/free/1/940658.shtml (June 24, 2007).  
 56. See Articles and News Reports Concerning the Zhang Yu “Sex for Roles” Scandal, supra 
note 51; “Sex for roles” scandal in chinese show business, supra note 51; Sex, Lies And Videotape: 
Actress’ Disclosure, supra note 51. 
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Chinese stars may be adept at creating and managing scandal to serve their 
own interests. As is the case elsewhere, scandal may provide a quick route 
to fame. 
III. China in Context 
What do Chinese scandals contribute to West’s call for more compara-
tive scandology, and what do they tell us about West’s thesis? Four 
conclusions follow from this brief survey of recent Chinese scandals. 
A. The State and the Media Market 
Chinese scandal is increasingly the product of both the state and the 
market—with much scandal developing without prior state approval. Such 
an observation would be unremarkable in Japan or the United States, but is 
striking in China, where the official media remain both the mouthpiece and 
the eyes and ears of the Communist Party. Recent scandals in China show 
that scandal now develops on two tracks. The first track, represented by the 
Shanghai Pension Fund scandal, continues to be largely state-managed: 
propaganda officials closely oversee news reports on emerging scandals, 
predetermining who is targeted in the media and in some cases pre-
approving standardized media scripts.57 Also on this track are scandals that 
never see the light of day—incidents never publicly reported by the media 
because of the sensitive nature of the matter.  
On the second track, however, scandal now develops independently of 
the state, or at least below censors’ radar screens. In the brick kiln case, 
commercialized media played a crucial role both in uncovering the scandal 
and in applying pressure on the authorities to address the scandal. In the 
fake dumpling case, the news media were aggressive in spreading word of 
the initial report. In some instances, including the brick kiln case, propa-
ganda authorities subsequently stepped in to manage the scandal and 
perhaps to cut off non-official discussion. Nevertheless, the growth of scan-
dal in China demonstrates the widening autonomy of China’s controlled 
media. China, like Japan and the United States, has always had conduct that 
transgressed formal or informal rules. The recent shift is that the media (in-
cluding bloggers or website operators, as in the Naked Party Secretary case) 
now may expose such transgressions, and thus influence what becomes 
scandal, without prior approval from the state.  
The development of this second track suggests that the type of conduct 
that results in scandal in China may also be changing. Scandal no longer 
                                                                                                                      
 57. Liebman, supra note 2, at 43-44. For one recent example, see Guangzhou Shi Xinwen 
Chuban He Guangbo Dianshi Ju Wangzhan [Website of the Guangzhou Municpal News Publication 
and Television and Broadcast Bureau], Guangdian Zongju Yinfa Guanyu Qieshi Jiaqiang He Gaijin 
Guangbo Dianshi Yulun Jiandu Gongzuo De Yaoqiu de Tongzhi [Notice from the State Administra-
tion of Radio Film and Television on Further Strengthening and Improving the Public Opinion 
Supervision Work of Radio and Television], http://www.xwgd.gov.cn/xggd/jsp/comm/comm_ 
detail.jsp?infoId=19837 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).  
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serves solely political purposes; it is increasingly determined by what read-
ers demand and what the media can get away with publishing. And the 
media is now willing and able to discuss a widening range of topics—from 
food safety to the sexual exploits of stars and (minor) officials. Increased 
media autonomy is the product of marketization and of new technologies. 
Yet the rise of scandal also reflects changing social norms, and increased 
willingness to discuss such changing norms.  
There may also be more ambivalence in China than in Japan about what 
conduct is deemed scandalous. This reflects the fact that both formal and 
informal norms regarding acceptable behavior appear to be more in flux in 
China: many traditional social norms have weakened, and wrongdoing is 
widespread. China’s shift to a market economy has resulted in decreased 
state control over individuals’ lives, but many in China argue that society 
now lacks clear conceptions of right and wrong. Some commentators argue 
that there can be no scandal in rapidly changing China, because nothing is 
surprising and because notions of right and wrong have become unsettled.58 
As one blogger contends, if wrongdoing is common and performed openly, 
there can be no scandal.59 In some cases, however, the fact that norms and 
rules are unclear also permits the media space to report—and thus to create 
scandal.  
A few other differences in the type of conduct that becomes scandal ap-
pear from this brief survey. As noted above, the state’s continued role in the 
management of the media means that there is a heavier state imprint on 
scandal in China than in Japan, regardless of whether the scandal originates 
from the commercialized media or from Party officials. Even scandals that 
initially appear to be fairly minor—such as the report about the alleged fake 
dumpling seller—are often carefully managed by the state. State reactions to 
scandals shape how scandals develop in China; such responses also send 
signals about permissible media conduct that sets boundaries on reporting 
on future scandals.  
Public ordering continues to predominate in China, in significant part 
due to the Communist Party’s long dominance. In addition, and as a conse-
quence, private groups appear to play a much smaller role in China than in 
Japan. Group self-regulation of the type West discusses is rare in China—
reflecting the Party-state’s distrust of organizations not directly under its 
control—and groups in China rarely appear to act to protect members. In most 
cases wrongdoing is placed entirely on the back of the individual, as reflected 
by the rapid arrests in the brick kiln and fake dumpling cases and in the pun-
ishment of Chen Liangyu. This emphasis on individual transgression, rather 
than the individual’s link to the larger group, reflects one of the important 
storylines of the current leadership: official wrongdoing reflects individual 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Cai Fanghua, Chouwen Buchou: Xing Jiaoyi Beihou De Daode Shifan, [Scandals Are 
Not Shameful: Loss of Moral Standards Behind Sex for Roles], Beijing Qingnian Bao 
[Beijing Youth News], January 18, 2004, available at http://ent.qianlong.com/4543/2004/01/18/ 
999@1834790.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 59. Posting of Zhongguo Meiyou Chouwen by Ying Fu Ji Jin, supra note 3. 
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transgressions, not systemic problems. The media may expose individual 
wrongs, but systemic critiques are off-limits.  
B. Law Matters 
China’s recent experiences also tell us, as West suggests in his discus-
sion of Japan, that law matters. To be sure, law in China sometimes must 
defer to politics (and almost certainly does so more often than in the United 
States or Japan). In explicitly political cases, the law often appears irrele-
vant, or is at most an afterthought: such cases reflect official decisions to 
target particular individuals. Chen Liangyu may have been guilty of finan-
cial crimes, but more than a year after the scandal came to light no criminal 
charges have been brought: the case is being handled by the Communist 
Party Discipline Committee. But in the second category of cases—those 
touching on rights violations and misconduct—law often plays a crucial role 
in framing arguments concerning the scandal. 
The evolution of legal standards and of legal awareness in China has 
provided a baseline that allows for the evaluation of wrongful conduct and 
for the politically safe exposure of transgressions. Legal rules affect what 
becomes scandal in China, in a way that they did not prior to China’s media 
and legal reforms.60 In the brick kiln case, for example, the revision of 
China’s labor laws—and increased government attention both to workplace 
safety and to social inequality—allowed space for China’s increasingly 
autonomous but still restricted media to expose scandalous conduct. Jour-
nalists could point not only to the horrific conditions of the brick kilns, but 
also to the fact that such conditions violate Chinese laws. The media framed 
their reports in terms of ensuring compliance with Chinese law. As a result, 
journalists could largely, albeit not entirely, critique the use of slave labor 
without fear of getting in trouble.61 The brick kiln scandal also led to calls to 
further strengthen China’s labor laws, thus showing how media exposure of 
scandal can also contribute to calls for legal change.62  
Law is not the only factor: appeals to popular morality remain impor-
tant, and when legal norms conflict with popular concepts of right and 
wrong, courts are often pressured to follow morality, not law. Nevertheless, 
law is now a mechanism for measuring wrongful conduct in a way not pos-
                                                                                                                      
 60. See Chen Jieren: Yao Nu An Tuxian Laodongfa Zhongda Loudong [Brick Kiln Slave Case 
Highlights the Significant Loopholes in the Labor Law], Fazhi Zhoubao E Fawang [E Law Net 
Online], June 22, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2007-06-22/115713288822.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2008); Yang Tao, Yong Sifa Gongzheng Huiying Gongzhong Dui Hei Zhuanyao An Zhiyi 
[Use Judicial Justice to Respond to the Public’s Questioning Concerning the Black Brick Kiln 
Case], Sina.com, July 5, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2007-07-05/092713380660.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
 61. The caveat is that it often remains difficult, and in some cases physically dangerous, for 
local journalists to expose local wrongdoing. Numerous media accounts in China have highlighted 
violence against journalists. 
 62. Shanxi Hei Zhuanyao Beiju Ruhe Buzai Chongyan [How to Avoid the Reoccurrence of 
the Shanxi Black Brick Kiln Tragedy], Guangming Ribao [Guangming Daily], June 30, 2007, 
http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2007-06/30/content_631714.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  
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sible during an era in which legal awareness was low and the media were 
more tightly controlled. 
And, counterintuitively, law may matter much more in China than it 
does in Japan. Although law “often stars in the show” in Japan (p. 5), West 
notes that scandals in Japan are generally not court centered (p. 140). Litiga-
tion and court proceedings are crucial in China. Media reports frequently 
sensationalize coverage of legal cases, and coverage of court proceedings is 
an important aspect of scandal coverage. The fact that a case is brought of-
ten provides a basis for the media to safely report on a scandal that might 
otherwise be off-limits and allows for the repetition of many of the most 
sensational allegations. Defamation litigation provides a forum in which 
sensational claims are contested—and repeated. And even in sensitive cases, 
the announcement of a court verdict often signals closure to the scandal, 
allowing the media to report on how wrongdoers have been punished.  
C. Institutions and Media Regulation Matter 
Extralegal regulation also matters. Although a web of laws and regula-
tions operate to control the Chinese media, the most important regulations 
are not legal: they are propaganda department instructions and informal 
norms that dictate what the Chinese media can and cannot report. The im-
portance of such norms highlights the need to differentiate between rules 
regarding conduct (what type of behavior is considered a transgression) and 
rules on how scandal is publicized (what the media may print). It also shows 
the importance of the institutional backdrop against which the Chinese me-
dia operates to the formation of scandal in China. 
West discusses both types of rules and notes how the elite media in 
Japan often cover up scandal (pp. 13–20). There is, however, relatively little 
discussion of which rules predominate. China’s experience shows how im-
portant dissemination rules are to determining what becomes scandal. In 
China, with an apparently ever-widening range of wrongdoing, scandal may 
inform more what the media are allowed to report than what type of conduct 
is socially acceptable. The importance of dissemination rules in China sug-
gests that different rules on dissemination, rather than different conceptions 
of socially acceptable conduct, may explain differences in what becomes 
scandal in different countries. This is particularly the case in a system like 
China, where the media are still subject to extensive state oversight. But, as 
West’s discussion of the reluctance of elite Japanese media to break scandals 
shows, similar issues arise even in systems with free media.  
D. Scandal in an International Context 
Third, internationalization of Chinese scandals may radically alter how 
scandals are covered. West notes a number of cases in which the Japanese 
media withheld reports on known scandals, only to have the Western 
media (in most cases, the Washington Post) report on the matter (pp. 16, 193, 
275–76). The fact that news of the scandal had broken overseas freed the 
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domestic Japanese media from the norms dictating that they remain silent, 
and they followed up with detailed reports of their own (p. 276). In some 
cases, international coverage permitted the media to pile on criticism, as in 
the case of former Prime Minister Uno. The prime minister was exposed not 
just for having a mistress but also for being stingy in his payments to her, 
causing, according to the domestic media, national embarrassment (p. 276).  
In China, the effect of international coverage of scandal appears to be 
the opposite. International coverage of Chinese scandals frequently results 
in orders from propaganda authorities that the media fall into line and use 
only officially sanctioned reports.63 International attention thus can cause a 
scandal to disappear from the domestic media. It can also result in a flurry 
of nationalistic domestic reports arguing that the scandal is just an attempt 
by others to harm China’s image, or that scandals reflect jealousy about 
China’s economic miracle. This reaction reflects both political sensitivities 
of China’s current rulers, and also a strong tradition of “not airing family 
problems in public.” 
This phenomenon is best seen in the domestic media’s recent reaction to 
reports in the Western media concerning product and food safety in China. 
The Chinese media have long played an important role in exposing poor 
quality products and in highlighting unsafe food.64 But faced with the inter-
nationalization of the issue, many prominent Chinese media have retreated, 
with major outlets such as CCTV, the official national television broad-
caster, running programs that defend the quality of China’s products—by 
pointing out, for example, that the only place lead paint was actually used in 
a Barbie Doll was in the doll’s eyelashes.65 
Japan has its share of issues where nationalist concerns may influence 
reporting on controversial topics.66 In Japan, however, these issues do not 
appear to fit the definition of scandal, as they are not hidden. China is not 
alone in treating scandals that risk harm to national image differently from 
other scandals. But recent experience suggests that whereas international 
coverage may free the Japanese media to cover sensitive issues, the opposite 
is sometimes the case in China.  
                                                                                                                      
 63. See, e.g., Zheng & Feng, supra note 30; Zhongguo Zhengfu Tongbao “Zhibaozi” Shijian, 
Cheng Zhenshi Shi Xinwen De Shengming [The Chinese Government Reported the “Cardboard 
Stuffing Dumpling” Incident and Indicated that Truthfulness Is the Life of News], Zhongguo 
Xinwen Wang [China News Agency Online], July 23, 2007, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/ 
news/2007/07-23/985684.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); see also Liebman, supra note 2, at 44.  
 64. See, e.g., Weekly Quality Reports Concerning Food, http://www.cctv.com/program/ 
mzzlbg/01/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Questionnaire on Food, http://business.sohu.com/ 
20050119/n224012991.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008) (posting a questionnaire regarding the hot 
issues of food safety of year 2005); Food Safety Webpage, http://www.cctv.com/health/special/ 
C12286/01/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2008) (a food safety webpage subordinated to the offi-
cial website of China Central Television). 
 65. See Furore over Chinese goods biased, says top official, Straits Times, Aug. 20, 2007, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/Free/Story/STIStory_149987.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 66. These issues include accounts of Japan’s wartime record in school textbooks, the treat-
ment of comfort women, and shrines to Japan’s war dead. 
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E. Refining Scandology 
Evidence from China largely supports West’s thesis. But it also suggests 
some areas in which further refinement might assist future scandologists. 
West is explicit that his goal is not to break new theoretical ground, but 
rather to offer a rich ethnographic account (p. 9). He certainly succeeds in 
this role. Yet West also, to a modest degree, leaves us wanting more: not 
more accounts of sex between teachers and students or of boy bands gone 
bad, but of further guidance that might help future scandologists down the 
track on which he has so impressively taken us.  
West is right to note the importance of rules, as opposed to culture, in 
shaping scandal. He is also correct about the importance of this distinction 
between culture and rules, and he recognizes that culture is an important 
variable in shaping rules (p. 10). Nevertheless, further exploration of the 
interaction between culture and the formation of both informal and formal 
rules would have helped to elucidate his argument and perhaps to make the 
job of future scandologists easier. Culture, of course, can mean many things; 
in the context of China, for example, much about scandal reflects current 
political culture, not traditional cultural norms.  
Likewise, West has provided a rich example of how the study of scandal 
can add to our understanding of how a society functions. But he has pro-
vided little in the way of a typology of scandal or a framework for placing 
scandal in comparative context. Although the types of scandals that develop 
will, as West shows, differ significantly across cultures, developing a typol-
ogy would facilitate comparative scandology and might help to highlight 
how scandals differ in their impact and importance in different settings. 
In China, the importance of scandal is obvious. It reveals details about 
the evolution of the political system, social norms, and the media. In Japan, 
the answer to the question “why should we care about scandal?” is perhaps 
a bit less obvious. West has captured the nuances of scandal in Japan and the 
United States, but has perhaps not done as much as he could have to con-
vince the reader of the importance of his topic. Indeed, one is left with the 
sense that by reveling in the details of scandal at the expense of examination 
of the broader institutional questions, West has perhaps undersold the im-
portance of his topic.  
Similarly, although West distinguishes between informal rules and for-
mal, or legal, rules, the extensive data he has collected might have offered 
him the opportunity to explore more deeply distinctions among different 
types of rules, and how such distinctions affect the formation of scandal. For 
example, although West analyzes both rules of conduct (what types of con-
duct is socially impermissible and thus begets scandal) and rules of 
dissemination (what violations of rules are exposed), he does not build on 
this distinction. Recent experiences in China show just how important this 
distinction is.  
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IV. Defamation Litigation: Honor and Censorship 
Scandal, as West notes, frequently results in reputational harm and, in 
Japan and China, litigation. West is clearly right that emphasis on honor 
means that there is something different at stake in such cases in Japan com-
pared to the United States.67 Defamation litigation in China contributes 
additional comparative perspective that makes West’s finding somewhat less 
surprising.  
Like Japanese law, Chinese law provides strong protections for defama-
tion plaintiffs.68 Legal standards are vague, but such vagueness generally 
favors plaintiffs. Truth is not a defense to defamation claims. One result is a 
significant volume of cases: more than five thousand in 2003.69 And plain-
tiffs win most of these cases.70 As in Japan, the volume of defamation 
litigation in China is striking given both popular conceptions that China is 
not a litigious society and data showing relatively low litigation rates in 
China. 
Yet the results in China may be even more notable than in Japan, be-
cause in China the defendants in most defamation cases are state-controlled 
media—the mouthpieces of the Communist Party. It is easier to sue com-
mercialized tabloids than official mouthpiece Party papers, and some key 
Party outlets appear off limits (as are most television stations); but official 
Party publications are sued and often lose.  
Strong defamation protections in China might at first appear to be, as in 
Japan, all about honor. Yet, strong protections for reputation rights in China 
are due as much to political and institutional dynamics as to cultural tradi-
tion. China and Japan share some aspects of cultural tradition; Chinese 
scholars have noted the importance of “face” as one factor that led to the 
inclusion of strong reputation protections in Chinese law.71 But four other 
factors also explain China’s legal protections for reputation rights.  
First, Chinese defamation law reflects China’s tortuous experience in the 
Cultural Revolution when personal attacks were common and the legal sys-
tem ceased to function. Reputation protections that were written into 
Chinese law in the 1980s were an attempt to send a strong signal that indi-
viduals would not again fall victim to the unrestrained use of personal 
attacks as a political tool.  
Second, defamation litigation also reflects a response to media that en-
gage in sensational reporting and at times exaggerate or fabricate news. 
                                                                                                                      
 67. This observation is also supported by another of West’s somewhat striking findings: the 
continued use of criminal defamation provisions in Japan. West reports more than one hundred 
criminal indictments for criminal defamation in Japan in 2004—most likely much higher even than 
China. In Japan, however, punishment for criminal defamation is both light and rare. Pp. 82–86. 
 68. The discussion of Chinese defamation litigation in this section is based on my prior work 
on this topic. See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical 
Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 33 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 44. 
 70. Id. at 50. 
 71. Id. at 87 & n.332. 
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Much of the focus on defamation litigation in China has drawn attention to 
the ways in which cases have been used to intimidate or silence the media. 
But a sizable volume of defamation litigation in China is brought by ordi-
nary persons who assert reputational harm due to exaggerated or false media 
reports. Defamation litigation thus can be understood to be in part a re-
sponse to one downside of commercialization—media that pay too little 
attention to the truth of their reports. 
Third, although many cases are brought against the official state media, 
strong reputation rights also dovetail with state interests in maintaining con-
trol of the media. Defamation law is not the primary means of restricting the 
media. The Central Party-state has numerous other mechanisms to control 
the media, ranging from shutting down publications to bans on individual 
journalists to jail sentences for those who transgress norms governing media 
conduct.72 Nevertheless, the fact that defamation lawsuits also restrain the 
media, especially the tabloids and other commercialized media that from 
time to time push boundaries of permissible content, helps to explain the 
appeal of the legal framework. The Party-state does not mind if defamation 
litigation helps to keep the media in check. 
Fourth, there is evidence that defamation litigation in China is being 
used to advance goals not fully contemplated when China adopted its Gen-
eral Principles of the Civil Law in 1986. Defamation litigation is used 
politically by low-ranking officials to quiet critics. But it is also used as a 
means of challenging the state, as ordinary citizens bring suit against Com-
munist Party mouthpiece newspapers. It may be easier for ordinary persons 
to sue the media than to sue government departments or officials. Contesting 
media accounts of their actions permits litigants to challenge state actions 
and determinations indirectly. Challenging state authority through defama-
tion litigation appears at times much easier than doing so through more 
direct mechanisms, including administrative litigation or direct petitions to 
the state. Given the absence of strong protections for individual rights in the 
Chinese legal system, individual litigants have used pro-plaintiff defamation 
standards as a means of asserting their rights. And although some in the 
Chinese media operate without concern for being sued simply by factoring 
in the risk of a defamation judgment into the cost of doing business (or ig-
noring it altogether), there is evidence from China that the risk of 
defamation liability is resulting in increased attention to professional stan-
dards in the media.73 
There are some additional similarities between China and Japan. West 
notes that courts have played an important role in Japan in tightening some 
                                                                                                                      
 72. Thus high-ranking officials rarely rely on defamation litigation to restrain the media. 
When defamation litigation is used politically to silence the media, it is often by low-ranking offi-
cials and corporate or business plaintiffs. Even mid-ranking officials are not criticized and therefore 
do not have any reason to sue. 
 73. One notable difference between Japan and China is that, according to West, few ordinary 
people bring defamation suits in Japan. Pp. 89–98. In China, suits by ordinary people appear com-
mon, reflecting attempts by individuals to clear their names and resist the official media. 
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of the plaintiff-friendly legal standards (p. 75). In doing so, Japanese courts 
have acted largely consistently with the trend in other liberal democracies.  
Chinese courts have taken some modest steps in the same direction. In a 
series of defamation cases, low-level Chinese courts have issued media-
friendly decisions, holding, in effect, that famous persons must be able to 
withstand a higher level of media scrutiny than those not in the public eye. 
Given the absence of support for such heightened standards in Chinese law, 
these “public person” decisions are striking for their implicit reliance on 
Western (and, in particular, American) precedent.74 Yet these recent Chinese 
decisions can also be explained by another factor: defendants in all of the 
Chinese “public person” cases have been powerful state media.  
What does China’s experience with defamation litigation contribute to 
West’s argument? The significant volume of defamation litigation in China 
suggests that we should not be so surprised that there is a lot of defamation 
litigation in Japan. Even with low possible recoveries (also true in China), 
litigants will use plaintiff-friendly legal standards both to seek damages and 
as a vehicle for publicly contesting media accounts. In both countries (and 
indeed in the United States, where there is arguably even less incentive for 
plaintiffs to sue, since plaintiff victories at trial are rare), defamation suits 
serve as a public statement against the truth of the media’s reports. The dis-
cussion of China highlights the need for a broad comparative framework: 
examining Japanese defamation law against not only that of China, but also 
of continental Europe, would likely lead to the conclusion that the United 
States is an outlier when it comes balancing free speech and reputation 
rights. West recognizes the limits of his use of the United States as a com-
parative reference point for his analysis of Japan. Nevertheless, the need for 
a broader comparative reference point may be strongest in an area such as 
defamation law, where the United States is not representative of most other 
liberal democracies. 
China’s experience with defamation litigation supports the argument that 
institutions and rules are crucial factors in shaping how and when privacy 
and reputation are protected. Defamation litigation is not just a manifesta-
tion of the importance of cultural concerns abut “face” or “honor.” 
Defamation protections initially were adopted in China in significant part 
because of concerns resulting from the Cultural Revolution, but they have 
developed, and defamation litigation in China has spread, because other in-
stitutional factors either encourage or at the very least have not blocked their 
development. Recent court decisions adopting a public person standard in 
China support the argument that institutional explanations are crucial75: al-
though on first impression Chinese courts may appear to be following global 
trends in defamation law, closer examination suggests that institutional fac-
tors also help to explain these cases. One wonders if similar factors might be 
at work in Japan, given that much of Japan’s elite media is often timid when 
                                                                                                                      
 74. A lawyer in one of the cases cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 75. Liebman, supra note 68, at 104–06. 
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it comes to reporting on official misconduct, and where, as West notes, defa-
mation litigation often succeeds in silencing the media.  
Examination of China also provides support for another of West’s key 
arguments: law on the books is an important determinant of how scandals 
develop and evolve. Indeed, West is perhaps a bit too surprised to find that 
Japan has twice as many defamation cases per capita than the United States. 
Given the very different standards that exist in the two countries, perhaps we 
should not be surprised at all. In light of the low odds of prevailing, we 
might wonder why even the small number of plaintiffs who do sue in the 
United States bother. The importance and prevalence of lawyers as gate-
keepers in the United States may contribute to the low level of defamation 
cases: lawyers are expensive and unlikely to undertake cases on a contingent 
fee basis when existing law makes it so hard to prevail. In China, many 
defamation cases are brought without lawyers, perhaps contributing to the 
frequency of such cases. It is unclear whether the same is also the case in 
Japan. Nevertheless, the total number of lawyers may be less important than 
the incentives that legal standards create for lawyers and litigants to under-
take such cases. 
Conclusion 
What lessons follow for those interested in scandal (and law) more gen-
erally? First, law matters, as West argues, in two respects. Law provides a 
framework for evaluating conduct. In China, this role may be particularly 
important, as it permits the media freedom to report on topics that might 
otherwise have been off limits. But formal rules also affect how scandals 
develop. In the case of defamation litigation, strong protections for reputa-
tion in China have provided incentives not only for the use of defamation 
litigation by those most likely to be plaintiffs in such cases—celebrities and 
government officials—but also by individuals seeking to win redress against 
an often unresponsive state. In addition, defamation litigation may also al-
low the media to discuss (and repeat) the underlying allegations or reports. 
Thus, the mere existence of a case may permit greater discussion in the me-
dia of sensitive or formerly taboo topics. 
Most of West’s account is dedicated to showing us how rules affect and 
determine scandal in Japan. As he points out, causation can run the other 
way: “one development that often follows modern scandal is the enactment 
of rules to combat the evil that is assumed to have caused . . . it” (p. 325). In 
Japan and the United States scandals result in rules that formalize through 
law what had previously been only informal norms. The same is true in 
China, where scandals often lead to the announcement of new legislation 
and of new enforcement campaigns. Given China’s reactive governance 
model and the Party-state’s fear of instability, scandal may play an even 
greater role in dictating policy agendas than it does in the West. The Chinese 
Party-state often reacts immediately to scandal, seeking to address the un-
derlying problem giving rise to the scandal and at the same time silencing 
discussion of the scandal by emphasizing the state’s responsiveness. This 
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may also be due in part to the fact that so many scandals in China seem to 
explode suddenly, the result of a media oversight system that incentivizes 
journalists, bloggers, and others to move as quickly as possible to ensure 
news gets out before propaganda authorities can intervene. Scandal in 
China, however, also serves to highlight broader problems in the Chinese 
system: major changes in policy or institutional relationships may be diffi-
cult absent scandal. There is a downside to using scandal as a basis for 
decision making. Pressure in China frequently produces a rush to judgment, 
with summary trials of offending parties and quick declarations that the is-
sue has been resolved, as in the brick kiln and fake dumpling cases. 
Reliance on scandal may be particularly troubling in a system in which 
norms of procedural justice remain weak. China demonstrates the positive 
role that scandal can play in a society undergoing profound change, but also 
some of the downsides of scandal’s influence on public policy. 
Second, as West also points out, nonlegal social norms matter. Here 
China may differ somewhat from Japan, in that many of the strong social 
norms that help determine how scandal plays out in Japan appear weaker in 
China. Uncertain social norms, combined with shifting state controls on the 
media, may make scandal less predictable in China. But these factors also 
may make it more important. 
This appears particularly to be the case in the context of professional 
norms. As West discusses, the Japanese media often appear to break profes-
sional and social norms (pp. 30–35). Media transgressions, including the 
creation of false news, are widespread. The same is true in China, with nu-
merous accounts of journalists creating fake news or accepting bribes to 
report or not to report on certain topics.76 One unresolved question in 
China—and perhaps in Japan as well—is whether scandal may breed pro-
fessionalism. In China, strong Party oversight of the media has left little 
room for media self-regulation or for the development of autonomous pro-
fessional identity. There are some signs that this is changing: some 
journalists and media outlets have begun to work together to fight  
defamation litigation, and the threat of defamation litigation is also resulting 
in greater emphasis on accurate reporting.77 Yet China continues to be a sys-
tem in which journalists are either extremely restricted in their coverage of 
sensitive topics (in the case of bans or restrictions on reporting) or else op-
erate with nearly complete autonomy, unlimited either by propaganda 
                                                                                                                      
 76. See Dong Jianzhong, Jia Xinwen Xianxiang Ying Yinqi Zhongshi [The Phenomenon of 
Fake News Should Arouse Attention], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua News Agency Online], Apr. 30, 
2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2007-04/30/content_6044904.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2008); Shendu Tantao Zhongguo Jia Xinwen Genyuan [In-Depth Discussions Concerning the Root 
of Fake News in China], Renmin Wang [People’s Daily Online], July 25, 2007, http:// 
www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/33232/6031117.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008); Zhuanjia: Jia 
Xinwen Shanghai Meiti Gongxinli [Expert: Fake News Impairs the Creditability of the Media], 
Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily], Apr. 20, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/ 
2007-04/20/content_6002577.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 77. See Articles and News Reports on Lawsuits About Inaccurate Reporting, http:// 
finance.dayoo.com/zhuanti/spjza/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008) (posting news reports and 
articles concerning two lawsuits brought against journalists regarding inaccurate reporting). 
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department supervision or professional norms. It remains to be seen whether 
the rise of scandal as an important aspect of Chinese media coverage will 
lead to greater professional identity, or whether it will fuel a race to the bot-
tom in ethical standards. 
Third, scandal matters, in part because it may reflect expanding free-
dom. West notes that scandal may provide society with a way of discussing 
otherwise socially taboo topics, and in so doing may help to shape social 
norms. In China the effect is even greater, as scandal permits discussion of 
what would otherwise be socially or politically taboo topics—from the sex 
lives of corrupt officials to slave labor. To the degree that Chinese scandals 
foster new norms, it could be argued that such norms arise from the state’s 
close supervision of scandal and not from scandal itself. Nevertheless, 
Chinese scandals appear noteworthy for their ability to have norm-
producing effects despite strong state control of the media. 
It would be a mistake to equate the rise of scandal in China entirely with 
greater media freedom: the Chinese media continue to operate subject to 
extensive oversight. But the spread of scandal coverage is a sign of the me-
dia’s ability to report on a widening range of topics. Even officially 
managed scandal may provide protection to journalists who seek to report 
on similar issues.  
China’s recent experiences support West’s broad argument: scandal is 
about rules as much as culture, and scandal is not simply about “cheap 
thrills” or “a sign of growing moral or social decline” (p. 9). Comparative 
scandology helps us to understand not just what becomes scandal, but also 
how scandal reflects and contributes to changing norms and institutions. 
Both West’s book and recent developments in China suggest that there may 
be an aspect of scandal that contributes to the formation of an open (and 
perhaps even democratic) society. West shows us scandal is important, but 
he never quite tells us what it is about scandal that makes it so important. 
Scandal in China points the way to a better understanding of the importance 
of scandal. That said, the main message of West’s book is that we should 
delight in the details of scandal and seediness. It would be hard for readers 
of his book to do anything else.  
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